Recently, General Tsadkan Gebretensae, Vice President of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray (2023–present), former Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Defense Forces (1991–2001), and a key member of the Central Command during the war in Northern Ethiopia (2020–2022), has warned of a growing risk of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in his opinion article published by The Africa report. While absolute certainty is rare in international relations, General Tsadkan’s deep knowledge of the region’s history, extensive military experiences, and keen understanding of the power dynamics shaping the Horn of Africa make difficult to rule out his assessment.
The General’s warning does not emerge out of nowhere but is grounded in the escalating tensions and increasing military preparedness of both Ethiopia and Eritrea, former allies against Tigrayan forces during the devastating two-year war in northern Ethiopia. While his statement has sparked intense public discourse and debate regarding the potential regional and national implications of a renewed conflict, little attention has been given to its impact on the Afar people, who in fact are at the epicenter of this growing geopolitical crisis. This article examines the positions, interests, hopes, and challenges of the Afar people in the context of the imminent Ethio-Eritrean war.
Glocalization of Marginalized Stakeholders in Horn of Africa’s Geopolitics and Looming Conflict
The Afar people are an indigenous transnational ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, primarily inhabiting northeastern Ethiopia, southern Eritrea, and parts of Djibouti. They have historically been mobile pastoralists, relying on livestock herding for their livelihood. As one of the indigenous peoples of the Horn of Africa, the Afar inhabit a region of immense geopolitical significance, encompassing over 700 kilometers of Red Sea coastline including the critical ports of Assab and Massawa as well as the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Their territories are rich in resources and strategically located which attracts the attentions and interests of many international powers and regional actors. Control over Afar lands and access to the Red Sea ports like Assab and Massawa directly influences trade routes and military positioning, impacting the balance of power in the region.
Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Horn of Africa has become a strategic focal point where global, regional, and national powers compete for influence over the region. This is mainly due to the region’s vicinity to the Red Sea which is a strategic maritime passage linking Europe, Africa, and Asia and international trades between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. Considered as artery of the global economy by the international community, the Red Sea is central to geopolitical rivalries, international trade security, and military positioning in the Horn of Africa.
The legacy of European colonialism fragmented the Afar across three modern nation-states, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti where they continue to experience varying degrees of political and economic marginalization. These states have historically sought to exploit Afar lands and resources for strategic advantages, often at the expense of local communities’ interests and livelihoods.
Moreover, during periods of geopolitical tensions, territorial disputes, and military confrontations between these postcolonial states, societies divided by artificial colonial boundaries often bear the greatest burden, serving as battlegrounds for interstate conflicts global power rivalries.
Today, a geopolitical shock is evolving, with the strategic Eritrean port of Assab becoming the geopolitical hotspot and focal point of hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Ethiopian government has recently sought to reclaim that the port of Assab is unjustly lost maritime territorial base that the former will take every possible means to restore the country’s historical right to access to the sea and position in the Red Sea through every possible means.
The growing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have been interpreted differently by various observers. Some perceive it as a form of psychological warfare, aimed at countering perceived threats from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) faction against the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray (TIRA). Others argue that a potential conflict with the TPLF would inherently involve Eritrea, given the newly formed alliance between the TPLF faction and (PFDJ, Eritrea’s ruling party for the past three decades. This development will force Ethiopian government to confront Eritrea militarily and use the opportunity to restore Ethiopia’s position in the Red Sea shore. Some analysts argue that Ethiopia’s worsening economic crisis and domestic instabilities and conflicts may compelled Ethiopian government to use tensions with Eritrea as a diversionary strategy to shift public focus away from internal perils. Such estimations on the outbreak of war often hosted contrary perspective that emphasizes on Ethiopia’s internal instability and conflicts and Eritrea’s economic and political stagnation as potential deterrents to a full-scale war.
Despite varying perspectives on the likelihood of war and the factors contributing to its potential outbreak, a critical question remains: What would this looming conflict mean for the transnational Afar community? The Afar people inhabit an extensive region spanning Northeastern Ethiopia to Southwestern Eritrea, including the extended coastal area along the Red Sea, where the port of Assab is located.
Historical precedents indicate that both Ethiopia and Eritrea have strategically leveraged and exploited the Afar people and their geopolitical locations and positions during times of crisis and conflict while largely neglecting their socioeconomic and political aspirations. This pattern underscores the community’s persistent marginalization despite its crucial role in regional power dynamics. Thus, the implications of this potential Ethio-Eritrean geopolitical war on the Horn of Africa, the local Afar communities, and the ensuing reactions from the local community to the post-war potential regional geopolitical ramifications need serious consideration. That is what Glocalization means in the context of this article.
Afars Hopes of Autonomism and Despair of Geopolitical Pawns
A comprehensive assessment of the historical and current conditions, as well as the future aspirations, of the Afar people in the Horn of Africa reveals that the impending Ethio-Eritrean conflict holds dual implications of both hope and peril for the transnational Afar society. This aligns with the concept of “conflict balance” in political science, which explains the twin destructive and transformative outcomes of war. The Afars form a transnational society spanning Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, maintaining connections, relationships, and activities across national borders. Members engage in social, economic, political, and cultural exchanges that transcend these boundaries (Vertovec, 2009). Conflict balance refers to the simultaneous weighing of war’s costs and opportunities, acknowledging that conflict can result in destruction and progress, suffering and transformation (Licklider, 1995).
While wars impose severe human, economic, and political burdens, they can also lead to geopolitical shifts, societal progress, economic advancements, and the emergence of new power structures (ibid). On one hand, the potential Ethio-Eritrean war is viewed as an opportunity to fulfill the long-standing aspiration for unity between the Ethiopian and Eritrean Afar communities, as well as to achieve common home rule under a political entity that ensures societal security for the Afar population. This perspective relies on the potential outcomes of the war in altering the status quo in Eritrea and Ethiopia’s strategic interests in the Red Sea.
A considerable number of Afars, both in Eritrea and Ethiopia, believe that a war with Ethiopia could end the subjugation of Eritrean Afars (Red Sea Afars) and the suppression of their nationalism, as well as fulfill their aspiration for unity with the Afars in Ethiopia. Eritrea seeks to maintain absolute control over its Red Sea coastline, particularly the resource-rich Assab port. The Eritrean government perceives the Afars’ sense of indigenous identity, ownership of coastal areas, and desire for autonomy as threats to Eritrean one party dictatorship and unitary rule. To counter this perceived threat, the regime has implemented a policy of systematic marginalization, repression, and forced displacement of Afar communities, an issue acknowledged by international organizations, including the UN.
Given the disproportionate nature of the imminent war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, many Afars believe it could lead to the complete defeat of Eritrea and the downfall of its tyrant. This, in turn, may pave the way for the Red Sea Afars to liberate themselves from oppressive dictatorship and consolidate control over their strategic coastal territories along the Red Sea. Proponents of this view consider Ethiopia a strategic ally in ending the political subjugation and marginalization of the Red Sea Afars, as well as in their aspiration to reunite with their fellow Afars in Ethiopia. This belief also frames Ethiopia as a protector against the brutality and dictatorship of the Eritrean regime.
The Afars’ prospective approach of siding with Ethiopia is not an arbitrary decision but a strategic calculation to utilize Ethiopia’s determination to leverage its transnational Afar population as a gateway to the Red Sea, a vital international trade route. Ethiopia has a long-standing geopolitical and strategic goal of securing access to the sea, a goal that is often perceived as a potential cause of military confrontations with Eritrea. Ethiopia’s experience with federalism and its constitutional recognition of the Afar people’s rights to self-rule and regional autonomy enhance its influence in securing strategic support from the transnational Afar community.
Despite Ethiopia’s advocacy for self-determination and federalism in political discourse, gaps remain in granting meaningful political representation and autonomy, along with tendencies of central control over regional affairs, which have contributed to the political and economic marginalization of Afars in Ethiopia. Thus, addressing these issues at the regional level could be Ethiopia’s strategy to win the hearts and minds of Afar communities beyond its borders, ultimately serving Africa’s second most populous state as a conduit to the Red Sea.
The Ethiopian government, therefore, must reframe its geopolitical discourse on access to the Red Sea by emphasizing the need for self-determination and the reunification of its Afar population rather than relying on the country’s demographic size and territorial expanse as justification for its claims to sea outlets. Moreover, instead of narrowly focusing on securing a maritime base or the port city of Assab, the Ethiopian government should campaign for the broader African coast of the Red Sea, which has historically been inhabited by the transnational Afar community. A limited approach centered solely on Assab risks backlash, even among the Red Sea Afars, who may resist further territorial fragmentation that could leave their communities divided and vulnerable under Eritrean rule. A more inclusive and historically grounded strategy would strengthen Ethiopia’s position while aligning with the aspirations of the Afar people.
Tigray’s Stake in the Looming Ethio-Eritrean Skirmish and Its Implications
Tigray cannot remain an island in the evolving war and regional geopolitical dynamics, as General Stadikan wished in his article. In fact, Tigray’s role, position, and interests will have significant geopolitical ramifications for the outcome of a potential Ethio-Eritrean war, as well as implications for the aspirations of the Afar people. While Tigray’s official stance on this matter remains unclear, if it continues to align itself with Ethiopia in its confrontation with Eritrea, both in principle and practice, it could play a positive role in Ethiopia’s demand for a sea outlet, the well-being of the transnational Afar population, and the stability of the broader Horn of Africa.
Militarily speaking, the Tigray region could serve as the most viable entry point through which the Ethiopian military could launch a strategic northern offensive and meaningfully collaborate with Eritrean opposition forces to destabilize and overthrow the regime in Asmara. However, such an alignment of Tigrayan elites appears unlikely due to the unresolved political rift between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Tigrayan political forces. In particular, the attempt to dismantle the Interim Government of Tigray, established through the Pretoria Agreement between the federal government and the TPLF, by a TPLF faction in March 2025 has further complicated the situation.”
Tigray functions as a transnational political entity with considerable influence in both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its political elites have historically sought access to the Red Sea, either through integration with Eritrea or by claiming maritime territory as part of an independent Tigray. This territorial aspiration, however, directly conflicts with the legitimate territorial claims of the Afar people, as Tigray lacks the historical and demographic presence necessary to justify its association with the Red Sea coastal areas. Consequently, the vision of a ‘Greater Tigray’ or ‘Agazian State’ with ultimate control over the Red Sea not only threatens the Afar people’s legitimate right to live in their homeland along the Red Sea coast but also triggers geopolitical tensions in an already volatile Horn of Africa.
Such developments would further complicate regional stability and the future of the Afar people in the region, given the uncertain nature of Tigray within Ethiopia and its leaders’ increasing interest in the Red Sea and northern Afar in Ethiopia as part of their aspirations for statehood. If war breaks out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tigrayan ultra nationalist could exploit the situation to further their hegemonic and statehood ambitions in the Red Sea region, positioning them in direct opposition to the Afars’ political aspirations. In this context, the imminent Ethio-Eritrean war is expected to turn the Afars into geopolitical pawns, as the war will primarily be fought in their territories, where the port of Assab is located, with devastating human and socioeconomic consequences.
What the Afar Learned from Abiy’s Turn to Them as a Tactical Ally during the Tigray War, but Were Ignored in the Peace process
The Afar people have endured generations of conflict, displacement, and economic hardship in the Horn of Africa. Despite the Afars’ role as Ethiopia’s border guardians against external threats for centuries, their sacrifices have often been met with betrayal by successive central governments. Nevertheless, for decades, the Afars have aspired to regional autonomy, territorial unity, and political inclusion. However, while their demands have been repeatedly acknowledged in rhetoric, they have largely been disregarded in practice.
During the imperial era, Afar sultans and traditional leaders petitioned Emperor Haile Selassie for territorial unification, as their people were divided across five provinces. Their request, however, was ignored. Under the Derg regime, negotiations with the Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM) for the creation of a unified Afar province were initially stalled and later only partially realized through the establishment of semi autonomous ‘Asseb Ras Gez,’ which encompassed more than 60% of the Red Sea Afar population and of their lands. However, the Derg’s motive for granting the Red Sea Afars the status of self-rule under ‘Asseb Ras Gez’ administration was not to address the legitimate concerns of the Afars but to avoid any potential armed resistance that would disrupt the country’s main transportation route from the port city to the capital, Addis Ababa.
Afar fighters played a significant role in the downfall of the Derg, fighting alongside the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). However, once the new government came to power, the Afars were sidelined yet again. This recurring pattern of political marginalization has fostered deep distrust among the Afar people towards the constitutional promises made since 1991. Despite all these challenges, the prolonged struggle of the Afars in Ethiopia resulted in the introduction of federalism in the country, through which the Afars were granted the right to self-government with the establishment of the Afar National Regional State within Ethiopia’s federal system, granting them the skeleton of political autonomy. The Afar region in Ethiopia faces ongoing challenges in governance, including inadequate infrastructure, limited institutional capacity, and issues related to corruption and nepotism. The regional administration is often perceived as functioning primarily as a political extension of the federal government, with limited accountability for the declining quality of public services and the continued socio-economic marginalization of the population.
The concerns and challenges faced by the Afar people have continued to be underemphasized under the post-EPRDF administration. For example, during the Northern Ethiopia conflict (2020–2022) between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Afar region played a strategically significant role. The Afar people made substantial sacrifices in supporting the Ethiopian government, effectively preventing the TPLF’s attempt to sever Ethiopia’s primary trade route via the Addis Ababa-Djibouti corridor. However, their cooperation with the Ethiopian government and their resistance to the TPLF’s efforts to traverse Afar territory to capture this crucial route came at a considerable cost.
When TPLF forces gained a strategic advantage and launched an incursion into northern Afar, citing the alleged presence of Eritrean troops as justification, the federal government did not intervene. High-ranking officials, including Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, downplayed the severity of the crisis, which included the occupation of nine Afar districts, the displacement of over 100,000 people, and the destruction of towns and villages by heavy artillery. As a result, Afar communities were left to defend themselves with limited resources, primarily relying on small arms against a heavily armed TPLF force.
The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) formally ended hostilities with the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement on November 2, 2022. This agreement committed both parties to a “permanent cessation of hostilities” to end the conflict in Northern Ethiopia. The agreement, which took effect on November 3, 2022, marked the official conclusion of a war that had caused significant losses, particularly among the Afar communities.
However, the peace process did not fully incorporate the perspectives and interests of the Afar communities, nor did it sufficiently address their wartime experiences and losses in a way that could foster a sustainable, people-centered peace. For instance, as of today, residents of Aradu and Hida Kebeles in Megalle Woreda, who were displaced during the conflict, are still unable to return to their home villages, which remain occupied by Tigrayan forces. Additionally, the Afar communities have faced ongoing security challenges from Djibouti-backed Issa/Somali militias. While the Ethiopian government responded promptly to the northern conflict when it aligned with its strategic interests, it has yet to implement effective measures to address these ongoing security threats.
Meanwhile, another geopolitical shift is emerging with the potential for conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This situation is largely influenced by Ethiopia’s longstanding geopolitical goal of securing access to the Red Sea and establishing base port along its coastline. Ethiopia often justifies its position through historical claims, particularly advocating for the restoration of its coastal access, including the Port of Assab, an objective that Eritrea firmly opposes. This situation raises an important question: What alternative strategies do the Afar communities have to mitigate the potential costs of this conflict, while advancing their long-term aspirations for shared governance and unity?
The Afars’ Viable Path in the Looming Ethio-Eritrean Skirmish and geopolitical Turmoil: Strategic Co-optation in the Ethiopian State
The Afar people’s historical trauma, marked by division, war, and continuous displacement, coupled with their long-standing aspirations for unity and home rule, places them in a highly precarious position, particularly in the context of the current geopolitical uncertainty in the Horn of Africa. Should an Ethio-Eritrean war erupt, the Afar people are likely to bear the heaviest burden, as their territory would likely become the primary battlefield. Under such circumstances, it is possible to theorize that the transnational Afar community could face four potential scenarios in their struggle to mitigate the burdens of war.
The first and most viable strategy involves aligning with Ethiopia based on the principles of strategic co-optation, although this alignment is not without reservations regarding the Ethiopian state’s commitment to Afar interests. Strategic co-optation refers to the process by which the state empowers marginalized or minority groups by integrating them into its political or military structures in exchange for wartime allegiance. For the Afar, supporting Ethiopia would require concrete guarantees of regional autonomy and political empowerment, ensuring that their interests are not once again sidelined after the conflict.
The second potential strategy is alignment with Eritrea, which remains a highly risky and unlikely option. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has long pursued a systematic campaign to suppress Afar nationalism, due in part to concerns over its ties to Afar communities across national borders. The historical actions of his government suggest that such an alignment would likely intensify the oppression of the Afar people and undermine their sovereignty.
The third potential path for the Afar people may be to remain neutral in the Ethio-Eritrean deadlock. However, the option of neutrality is unlikely to be viable, as both warring sides are expected to pressure the Afar to take a definitive stance. Furthermore, since much of the conflict is anticipated to unfold within Afar territory, the region will inevitably become embroiled in the hostilities.
The fourth potential outcome the Afar may consider in the context of the looming Ethio-Eritrean war is the pursuit of complete political autonomy, an aspiration long held by the Afar, yet one that remains extremely difficult to achieve. This challenge stems from the lack of international, regional, and national political will and support for the Afar’s goal of establishing a sovereign political entity. Given the current geopolitical landscape, the constraints of international law, and ongoing regional power struggles, such a move could provoke significant opposition from the states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, as the latter view the Afar’s ambitions as a direct threat to their own interests and territorial integrity.
A key factor that will still significantly influence the Afar’s decision-making vis-à-vis the imminent Ethio-Eritrean war is the role of Tigray in the conflict. If Tigray sides with Ethiopia, the Afar’s strategic role may shift, but its alliance with Ethiopia is likely to remain unchanged. However, should Tigray align with Eritrea, the Afar people could face heightened threats, potentially compelling them to adopt a more decisive stance in the pursuit of their political aspirations. If Tigray remains neutral, it may wait for the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea to weaken both sides, thereby positioning itself to claim sovereign nation state of Israli state model and assert control over the Red Sea. This particular political project is very dangerous to Afars of the Horn of Africa as it makes them vulnerable to existential threats from all directions. Thus, the approach in which the Ethiopian government addresses its issues with Tigray will significantly impact the future of the region and, consequently, the fate of the Afar people in the Horn of Africa.
Conclusion
If a conflict were to break out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as some have predicted, the transnational Afar community is likely to align with Ethiopia, regardless of their citizenship status. However, this alliance should not be unconditional. The Afar people must seek concrete assurances to safeguard their interests and ensure they are not marginalized once again after the conflict.
One potential outcome of a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea could be a regime change in Asmara. A post-Isaias Eritrea would likely face instability and governance challenges during the transition. Given the strategic geographical position of the Afar and their community’s influence, their role in both the conflict and its aftermath will be crucial. Therefore, discussions concerning Eritrea’s future, Ethiopia’s interests, and the Afar’s long-standing aspirations must include the Afar National Regional State Government in Ethiopia, Red Sea Afar communities, traditional leaders, and key community representatives, regardless of their locations. This would allow the Afar people to negotiate their interests with important national and regional actors, aiming to minimize the impact of the conflict on the transnational Afar community.
The political empowerment of the Afar people within Ethiopia is crucial. Eritrean Afars have endured significant hardships under the regime of Isaias Afwerki, with many being forced into refugee status. Their representation and ability to advocate for their interests largely depend on the Afar Regional State in Ethiopia. Therefore, it is essential that the Afar region is granted genuine political influence, beyond symbolic representation, to effectively represent Afar interests across the Horn of Africa.
The Afar must be recognized as a primary stakeholder in Ethiopia’s maritime strategy, both during and after the conflict. Their historical and natural connections to the Red Sea should not be overlooked. Ethiopia must ensure that the Afar are fully included in discussions regarding access to the Red Sea, particularly in securing the Assab port and asserting maritime claims. Without these assurances, the Afar risk being marginalized and facing further exploitation, which could leave their communities in a state of devastation following the conflict. Ethiopia must acknowledge that, without the trust and active involvement of the Afar, securing access to the Red Sea, especially the port of Assab, will be extremely difficult.
Jemal Muhamed Adem(PhD) & Muhamed Ahmed Yasin, lecturers at Samara University, reachable
تحليلات المركز الإفريقي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات (أفروبوليسي)
المركز الإفريقي للأبحاث ودراسة السياساتat jemalmuhamed166@gmail.com/moahmedyy@gmail.com
